Edouard.ai
Back to blogAnalyses Juridiques

Requisitions and LPM 2024-2030: Legal Precedents and Case Law

February 3, 2026
17 min read
402 views

Requisitions and LPM 2024-2030: Legal Precedents and Case Law

Analysis of French state requisition powers and their implications for crypto-assets

December 2025 | Legal Analysis | Reference Document


Table of Contents

  1. Introduction: An Exceptional Power Become Ordinary
  2. The New Requisition Regime (LPM 2024-2030)
  3. French History and Precedents
  4. Constitutional Case Law
  5. Potential Application to Crypto-Assets
  6. International Comparisons
  7. Application Scenarios
  8. Legal Remedies
  9. Protection Strategies
  10. Sources and References

1. Introduction: An Exceptional Power Become Ordinary

The LPM 2023 transforms wartime requisitions into an ordinary administrative tool.

The Military Programming Law (LPM) 2024-2030, promulgated on August 1, 2023, has profoundly overhauled the requisition regime inscribed in the Defense Code. These provisions, initially designed for war situations, have been expanded and eased significantly.

1.1 The Evolution of the Legislative Title

Before LPM 2023:

Title I: "Requisitions for the general needs of the nation"

After LPM 2023:

Title I: "Requisitions for the needs of defense and national security"

This terminological change is not trivial: it considerably extends the potential scope of application.

1.2 Why This Reform?

The explanatory memorandum of the LPM invokes:

  • The need to adapt the law to "hybrid threats"
  • The obsolescence of the regime from the 1959 Ordinance
  • Lessons learned from the Covid-19 crisis
  • Geopolitical tensions (Ukraine, Taiwan)

"The modernization of the requisition regime is made necessary by the evolution of threats to the nation."

Source: Explanatory memorandum, LPM 2024-2030 bill


2. The New Requisition Regime (LPM 2024-2030)

Any person, all goods and services: the unprecedented extent of State powers.

2.1 Article L. 2212-1 of the Defense Code

The new Article L. 2212-1 constitutes the core of the system:

"In case of threat, current or foreseeable, to essential activities for the life of the Nation, the protection of the population, the integrity of the territory or the permanence of the institutions of the Republic or of a nature to justify the implementation of the State's international defense commitments, the requisition of any person, natural or legal, and of all goods and services necessary to address it may be decided by decree in Council of Ministers."

Source: Article L. 2212-1 of the Defense Code, modified by Article 47 of Law No. 2023-703

2.2 Analysis of Key Terms

Term Interpretation Scope
"current or foreseeable threat" No need for an immediate threat Very broad
"essential activities for the life of the Nation" Non-exhaustive, interpretable Extensible
"any person, natural or legal" Citizens AND businesses Universal
"all goods and services" No exclusion Total
"decree in Council of Ministers" Executive alone, no Parliament Fast

2.3 The Prior Blocking Mechanism

Article L. 2211-2 introduces a power of anticipatory blocking:

"In the cases provided for in Article L. 2212-1, the blocking of movable property for the purpose of requisitioning them may be prescribed by decree in Council of Ministers."

Source: Article L. 2211-2 of the Defense Code

Consequence: The State can freeze assets before even formally requisitioning them.

2.4 The Implementing Decree

Decree No. 2024-895 of October 1, 2024 specifies the procedures:

Aspect Provision
Entry into force Day after publication (October 2, 2024)
Competent authority Prime Minister, delegated ministers
Compensation Provided but at "fair price" (assessed by the State)
Appeal Administrative jurisdiction
Appeal deadline 2 months

3. French History and Precedents

From horses in 14-18 to Covid masks: a century of French requisitions.

3.1 Wartime Requisitions (1914-1918, 1939-1945)

World War I:

  • Massive requisition of horses, vehicles, factories
  • Total industrial mobilization
  • Considerable property losses

World War II:

  • Requisitions under Vichy (often for Germany's benefit)
  • Requisitions by the Resistance/Free France
  • Post-war litigation for decades

3.2 Contemporary Requisitions

Health crisis (2020):

During the Covid-19 pandemic, the State proceeded with requisitions:

  • FFP2 masks (March 2020)
  • Chloroquine stocks
  • ICU beds

"The decree of March 13, 2020 allowed the requisition of protective masks and their components."

Source: Decree No. 2020-247 of March 13, 2020

Energy crisis (2022-2023):

Requisitions considered but not implemented for:

  • Refinery staff (TotalEnergies strikes)
  • Fuel stocks

3.3 Summary Table of Recent Requisitions

Year Context Object Legal Basis
2020 Covid-19 FFP2 masks Decree 2020-247
2020 Covid-19 Hand sanitizer gel Decree 2020-293
2020 Covid-19 Paracetamol Ministerial order
2022 Strikes Refinery staff (considered) Not applied
2023 Pensions Staff (discussions) Not applied

4. Constitutional Case Law

The Constitutional Council validates the LPM despite its considerable scope.

4.1 Constitutional Council Decision on the LPM

The Constitutional Council validated the LPM 2024-2030 in its decision No. 2023-854 DC of July 28, 2023.

On requisitions:

"The provisions relating to requisitions [...] are consistent with the Constitution. They respond to general interest reasons related to national defense and state security."

Source: CC, decision No. 2023-854 DC, consideration 32

But the Council issued an interpretive reservation:

"These provisions cannot allow requisitions affecting fundamental freedoms except to the extent strictly necessary for safeguarding the interests mentioned."

Source: CC, decision No. 2023-854 DC, consideration 35

4.2 Relevant Prior Case Law

CC, December 13, 1985, No. 85-198 DC (New Caledonia state of emergency law):

"The legislature may provide for requisition measures, subject to respect for the principle of proportionality and judicial guarantees."

CE, Ass., February 17, 1950, Dame Lamotte:

"Appeal for abuse of power is open even without text against any administrative act."

→ Principle: any requisition remains challengeable before the administrative judge.

CC, January 16, 1982, No. 81-132 DC (Nationalizations):

"Deprivation of property can only be pronounced in case of legally established public necessity and subject to fair compensation."

→ Principle: compensation must be "fair," not necessarily at market price.

4.3 The Principle of Proportionality

Any requisition must respect the principle of proportionality:

Criterion Requirement
Necessity The measure must be necessary for the objective
Adequacy The measure must be apt to achieve the objective
Proportionality stricto sensu The infringement of rights must be proportionate to the expected benefit

5. Potential Application to Crypto-Assets

Bitcoin is property: therefore legally requisitionable according to the text.

5.1 Are Crypto-Assets Requisitionable?

Legal analysis:

Question Answer Justification
Are crypto-assets "property"? ✅ Yes Intangible movable property (L. 54-10-1 CMF)
Can they be requisitioned? ⚠️ Textually yes "All goods"
How technically? ❓ Problematic Requires access to private keys

5.2 Crypto Requisition Scenarios

Scenario 1: Requisition of a French exchange

Step Action
1 Decree in Council of Ministers
2 Notification to the CASP
3 Account freeze
4 Transfer to State-controlled address

Feasibility: ✅ Technically simple (CASPs control the keys)

Scenario 2: Requisition of a French crypto company (Ledger)

Step Action
1 Decree in Council of Ministers
2 Taking control of the company
3 Obligation of technical cooperation
4 Deployment of extractive updates

Feasibility: ⚠️ Technically possible (cf. Ledger Recover)

Scenario 3: Requisition of an individual's crypto-assets

Step Action
1 Targeted or general decree
2 Declaration/surrender obligation
3 Penalties for non-cooperation

Feasibility: ❌ Technically difficult (self-custody resistant)

5.3 Technical Limits of Requisition

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                HIERARCHY OF RESISTANCE TO REQUISITION               │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

     Minimal resistance                    Maximum resistance
            │                                        │
            ▼                                        ▼
┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  French CEX  │  Ledger  │  Trezor  │  Coldcard  │  SeedSigner     │
│  (Coinhouse) │  (FR)    │  (CZ)    │  (CA)      │  (DIY)          │
│              │          │          │            │                 │
│  ✅ Easily   │  ⚠️ Via  │  ⚠️ EU   │  ❌ Beyond │  ❌ No entity   │
│  requisition-│  forced  │  coop    │  direct    │  to requisition │
│  able        │  update  │  possible│  reach     │                 │
└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

5.4 Expert Analysis

"The LPM gives the government considerable powers, but its application to crypto-assets runs into a technical reality: you cannot requisition what you cannot identify or seize."

Source: Maître David Guyon, Lawyer, LPM analysis, June 2024


6. International Comparisons

Executive Order 6102: when Roosevelt confiscated Americans' gold.

6.1 United States: Executive Order 6102 (1933)

Context: Great Depression, flight from the dollar.

Measure: President Roosevelt prohibited gold ownership by individuals.

"All persons are required to deliver [...] all gold coin, gold bullion and gold certificates in their possession."

Source: Executive Order 6102, April 5, 1933

Result:

  • Massive gold confiscation
  • Compensation at $20.67/ounce
  • Immediate revaluation to $35/ounce (40% loss for citizens)
  • Penalty: $10,000 fine and 10 years in prison

Crypto parallel: An "Executive Order 6102 for Bitcoin" is regularly mentioned as a risk.

6.2 United Kingdom: Emergency Powers Act

The United Kingdom has similar emergency powers via the Emergency Powers Act 1920 (amended):

Power Description
Emergency proclamation By the Crown, on government advice
Requisitions "Essential" goods and services
Duration 7 days renewable (parliamentary approval)

Key difference: Tighter parliamentary control than in France.

6.3 Germany: Notstandsverfassung

The German Constitution provides for an emergency regime (Notstandsverfassung) since 1968:

Regime Trigger Powers
Spannungsfall International tension Limited requisitions
Verteidigungsfall Armed aggression Extended powers
Innerer Notstand Internal threat Federal intervention

Key difference: Stricter controls, role of Bundestag and Bundesrat.

6.4 Comparative Table

Country Requisition Power Control Compensation
🇫🇷 France Very broad (LPM) Weak (ex post appeal) "Fair price"
🇺🇸 USA Via Emergency Powers Moderate (Congress) Compensation provided
🇬🇧 UK Emergency Powers Act Strong (Parliament 7d) Provided
🇩🇪 Germany Notstandsverfassung Strong (Bundestag) Constitutional guarantee
🇨🇭 Switzerland Exceptional powers Strong (referendum possible) Constitutional guarantee

7. Application Scenarios

Economic crisis, attack, or strategic reserve: three plausible triggers.

7.1 "Major Economic Crisis" Scenario

Context:

  • French sovereign debt crisis
  • Capital flight to Bitcoin
  • Franc devaluation (if euro exit)

Possible measures:

  1. Ban on crypto-asset purchases
  2. Requisition of French exchanges
  3. Wallet declaration obligation
  4. Confiscatory exit taxation

Probability: Low to medium term, but not zero in case of major crisis.

7.2 "Terrorism Financing" Scenario

Context:

  • Major attack on French soil
  • Financing identified via Bitcoin

Possible measures:

  1. Immediate freezing of suspects' assets
  2. Data requisition from exchanges
  3. Pressure on hardware wallet manufacturers
  4. Ban on privacy coins

Probability: High in case of attack, predictable emotional reaction.

7.3 "Bitcoin Strategic Reserve" Scenario

Context:

  • Bitcoin adoption by other States (USA, Russia)
  • Race for Bitcoin reserves
  • France wants to build a reserve

Possible measures:

  1. Market purchase (legal option)
  2. Requisition of citizens' holdings (extreme option)
  3. National mining (technical option)

Probability: Low for requisition, possible for public purchase.

7.4 Probability/Impact Matrix

Scenario Probability Impact Preparation Needed
Major economic crisis 🟡 Medium 🔴 Very high High
Crypto-financed attack 🟡 Medium 🟡 Medium Medium
Strategic reserve 🟢 Low 🔴 Very high Low
Major armed conflict 🟢 Low 🔴 Total High if concerned

8. Legal Remedies

Summary proceedings, QPC, and ECHR: challenging a requisition before the courts.

8.1 Appeal for Abuse of Power

Jurisdiction: Administrative court, then Council of State.

Deadline: 2 months from notification or publication.

Grounds invocable:

  • Incompetence of the author of the act
  • Formal or procedural defect
  • Error of law
  • Manifest error of assessment
  • Misuse of power

Suspensive effect: ❌ No, except summary suspension.

8.2 Summary Freedom Proceedings

Conditions (Article L. 521-2 CJA):

  • Serious and manifestly illegal infringement
  • Of a fundamental freedom
  • Urgency

Judgment deadline: 48 hours

Freedoms invocable:

  • Property rights
  • Freedom of enterprise
  • Respect for privacy

8.3 Summary Suspension

Conditions (Article L. 521-1 CJA):

  • Urgency
  • Serious doubt about legality

Effect: Suspension of execution of the act.

8.4 Priority Question of Constitutionality (QPC)

Conditions:

  • Question raised in the context of a dispute
  • Legislative provision applicable to the dispute
  • Question not already decided
  • Serious question

Constitutional rights invocable:

  • Article 17 DDHC (property)
  • Article 2 DDHC (liberty)
  • Article 13 DDHC (equality before public burdens)

8.5 European Appeal (ECHR)

After exhausting domestic remedies:

ECHR Article Protection
Article 1 Protocol 1 Property rights
Article 8 Privacy
Article 13 Right to an effective remedy

Deadline: 4 months after final domestic decision.

Average duration: 5-7 years before judgment.


9. Protection Strategies

Self-custody and jurisdictional diversification: the three-level protection architecture.

9.1 Jurisdictional Diversification

Principle: Distribute your assets among several jurisdictions to limit the impact of a single requisition.

Jurisdiction FR Requisition Risk Advantage
France 🔴 Maximum -
EU (other country) 🟡 Via cooperation Legal distance
Switzerland 🟢 Low Neutrality, bank secrecy
Singapore 🟢 Low Distance, stability
Self-custody 🟢 Technically impossible Total sovereignty

9.2 Self-Custody as Protection

Why self-custody resists requisition:

  1. No third party to requisition: No company holds your keys
  2. No location: A wallet can be anywhere
  3. No physical confiscation: A seed phrase can be memorized
  4. Plausible deniability: Passphrase = hidden wallet

9.3 Multi-Level Architecture

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    PROTECTION ARCHITECTURE                          │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

  Level 1: DISPLAY (requisitionable)
  ────────────────────────────────────
  Small amount on French exchange
  Declared, compliant, visible
  = Acceptable "sacrifice"

  Level 2: INTERMEDIATE (difficult)
  ────────────────────────────────────
  Hardware wallet (Coldcard, outside EU)
  Self-custody, secured seed
  = Technical protection

  Level 3: SOVEREIGN (resistant)
  ────────────────────────────────────
  Multisig with distributed keys
  Passphrase (hidden wallet)
  Key in third jurisdiction
  = Maximum protection

9.4 Limits and Risks

⚠️ Warning: These strategies aim at legitimate asset protection. Fraudulent organization of insolvency is a criminal offense.

What is legal:

  • Holding your crypto-assets in self-custody
  • Distributing your assets across several jurisdictions
  • Using privacy technologies

What is not:

  • Transferring assets to escape an already pronounced requisition
  • Lying about the existence or value of your assets
  • Organizing your insolvency against a tax debt

📚 Related Articles — Legal Analyses


10. Sources and References

Legislative and Regulatory Texts

  • Law No. 2023-703 of August 1, 2023 relating to military programming for the years 2024 to 2030
  • Decree No. 2024-895 of October 1, 2024 relating to requisitions
  • Defense Code, Book II, Title I (requisitions)
  • Ordinance No. 59-63 of January 6, 1959 (former regime)

Constitutional Decisions

  • CC, decision No. 2023-854 DC of July 28, 2023 (LPM)
  • CC, decision No. 85-198 DC of December 13, 1985 (state of emergency)
  • CC, decision No. 81-132 DC of January 16, 1982 (nationalizations)

Administrative Case Law

  • CE, Ass., February 17, 1950, Dame Lamotte
  • CE, October 12, 2009, No. 329628 (requisition of strikers)
  • CE, ref., March 22, 2020, No. 439674 (Covid requisition)

Historical Sources

  • Executive Order 6102, April 5, 1933 (gold confiscation in USA)
  • Emergency Powers Act 1920 (United Kingdom)
  • Grundgesetz, Articles 35, 87a, 91 (Germany)

Doctrinal Analyses

  • Maître David Guyon, "Requisitions under the 2023-2030 Military Programming Law," June 2024
  • IRIS France, "The Essential Reform of Defense Code Requisitions," November 2024
  • Public Law Review, "The New Requisition Regime," 2024

Parliamentary Documentation

  • National Assembly, Report No. 1234 on the LPM 2024-2030 bill
  • Senate, Report No. 567 on the LPM 2024-2030 bill
  • Explanatory memorandum, LPM bill

Appendix: Chronology of Exceptional Powers in France

Year Text Scope
1849 State of siege law Military
1955 State of emergency law Civil (Algeria)
1959 Requisitions ordinance National defense
2015 State of emergency post-attacks Extended civil
2020 Health emergency state Health
2023 LPM 2024-2030 Expanded requisitions
2024 LPM implementing decree Operationalization

Document written in December 2025

This document is provided for informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice. Consult a lawyer for your personal situation.

Share:

Want to know more?

Discover all our articles and guides to master crypto.

View all articles