Requisitions and LPM 2024-2030: Legal Precedents and Case Law
Analysis of French state requisition powers and their implications for crypto-assets
December 2025 | Legal Analysis | Reference Document
Table of Contents
- Introduction: An Exceptional Power Become Ordinary
- The New Requisition Regime (LPM 2024-2030)
- French History and Precedents
- Constitutional Case Law
- Potential Application to Crypto-Assets
- International Comparisons
- Application Scenarios
- Legal Remedies
- Protection Strategies
- Sources and References
1. Introduction: An Exceptional Power Become Ordinary
The LPM 2023 transforms wartime requisitions into an ordinary administrative tool.
The Military Programming Law (LPM) 2024-2030, promulgated on August 1, 2023, has profoundly overhauled the requisition regime inscribed in the Defense Code. These provisions, initially designed for war situations, have been expanded and eased significantly.
1.1 The Evolution of the Legislative Title
Before LPM 2023:
Title I: "Requisitions for the general needs of the nation"
After LPM 2023:
Title I: "Requisitions for the needs of defense and national security"
This terminological change is not trivial: it considerably extends the potential scope of application.
1.2 Why This Reform?
The explanatory memorandum of the LPM invokes:
- The need to adapt the law to "hybrid threats"
- The obsolescence of the regime from the 1959 Ordinance
- Lessons learned from the Covid-19 crisis
- Geopolitical tensions (Ukraine, Taiwan)
"The modernization of the requisition regime is made necessary by the evolution of threats to the nation."
Source: Explanatory memorandum, LPM 2024-2030 bill
2. The New Requisition Regime (LPM 2024-2030)
Any person, all goods and services: the unprecedented extent of State powers.
2.1 Article L. 2212-1 of the Defense Code
The new Article L. 2212-1 constitutes the core of the system:
"In case of threat, current or foreseeable, to essential activities for the life of the Nation, the protection of the population, the integrity of the territory or the permanence of the institutions of the Republic or of a nature to justify the implementation of the State's international defense commitments, the requisition of any person, natural or legal, and of all goods and services necessary to address it may be decided by decree in Council of Ministers."
Source: Article L. 2212-1 of the Defense Code, modified by Article 47 of Law No. 2023-703
2.2 Analysis of Key Terms
| Term | Interpretation | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| "current or foreseeable threat" | No need for an immediate threat | Very broad |
| "essential activities for the life of the Nation" | Non-exhaustive, interpretable | Extensible |
| "any person, natural or legal" | Citizens AND businesses | Universal |
| "all goods and services" | No exclusion | Total |
| "decree in Council of Ministers" | Executive alone, no Parliament | Fast |
2.3 The Prior Blocking Mechanism
Article L. 2211-2 introduces a power of anticipatory blocking:
"In the cases provided for in Article L. 2212-1, the blocking of movable property for the purpose of requisitioning them may be prescribed by decree in Council of Ministers."
Source: Article L. 2211-2 of the Defense Code
Consequence: The State can freeze assets before even formally requisitioning them.
2.4 The Implementing Decree
Decree No. 2024-895 of October 1, 2024 specifies the procedures:
| Aspect | Provision |
|---|---|
| Entry into force | Day after publication (October 2, 2024) |
| Competent authority | Prime Minister, delegated ministers |
| Compensation | Provided but at "fair price" (assessed by the State) |
| Appeal | Administrative jurisdiction |
| Appeal deadline | 2 months |
3. French History and Precedents
From horses in 14-18 to Covid masks: a century of French requisitions.
3.1 Wartime Requisitions (1914-1918, 1939-1945)
World War I:
- Massive requisition of horses, vehicles, factories
- Total industrial mobilization
- Considerable property losses
World War II:
- Requisitions under Vichy (often for Germany's benefit)
- Requisitions by the Resistance/Free France
- Post-war litigation for decades
3.2 Contemporary Requisitions
Health crisis (2020):
During the Covid-19 pandemic, the State proceeded with requisitions:
- FFP2 masks (March 2020)
- Chloroquine stocks
- ICU beds
"The decree of March 13, 2020 allowed the requisition of protective masks and their components."
Source: Decree No. 2020-247 of March 13, 2020
Energy crisis (2022-2023):
Requisitions considered but not implemented for:
- Refinery staff (TotalEnergies strikes)
- Fuel stocks
3.3 Summary Table of Recent Requisitions
| Year | Context | Object | Legal Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Covid-19 | FFP2 masks | Decree 2020-247 |
| 2020 | Covid-19 | Hand sanitizer gel | Decree 2020-293 |
| 2020 | Covid-19 | Paracetamol | Ministerial order |
| 2022 | Strikes | Refinery staff (considered) | Not applied |
| 2023 | Pensions | Staff (discussions) | Not applied |
4. Constitutional Case Law
The Constitutional Council validates the LPM despite its considerable scope.
4.1 Constitutional Council Decision on the LPM
The Constitutional Council validated the LPM 2024-2030 in its decision No. 2023-854 DC of July 28, 2023.
On requisitions:
"The provisions relating to requisitions [...] are consistent with the Constitution. They respond to general interest reasons related to national defense and state security."
Source: CC, decision No. 2023-854 DC, consideration 32
But the Council issued an interpretive reservation:
"These provisions cannot allow requisitions affecting fundamental freedoms except to the extent strictly necessary for safeguarding the interests mentioned."
Source: CC, decision No. 2023-854 DC, consideration 35
4.2 Relevant Prior Case Law
CC, December 13, 1985, No. 85-198 DC (New Caledonia state of emergency law):
"The legislature may provide for requisition measures, subject to respect for the principle of proportionality and judicial guarantees."
CE, Ass., February 17, 1950, Dame Lamotte:
"Appeal for abuse of power is open even without text against any administrative act."
→ Principle: any requisition remains challengeable before the administrative judge.
CC, January 16, 1982, No. 81-132 DC (Nationalizations):
"Deprivation of property can only be pronounced in case of legally established public necessity and subject to fair compensation."
→ Principle: compensation must be "fair," not necessarily at market price.
4.3 The Principle of Proportionality
Any requisition must respect the principle of proportionality:
| Criterion | Requirement |
|---|---|
| Necessity | The measure must be necessary for the objective |
| Adequacy | The measure must be apt to achieve the objective |
| Proportionality stricto sensu | The infringement of rights must be proportionate to the expected benefit |
5. Potential Application to Crypto-Assets
Bitcoin is property: therefore legally requisitionable according to the text.
5.1 Are Crypto-Assets Requisitionable?
Legal analysis:
| Question | Answer | Justification |
|---|---|---|
| Are crypto-assets "property"? | ✅ Yes | Intangible movable property (L. 54-10-1 CMF) |
| Can they be requisitioned? | ⚠️ Textually yes | "All goods" |
| How technically? | ❓ Problematic | Requires access to private keys |
5.2 Crypto Requisition Scenarios
Scenario 1: Requisition of a French exchange
| Step | Action |
|---|---|
| 1 | Decree in Council of Ministers |
| 2 | Notification to the CASP |
| 3 | Account freeze |
| 4 | Transfer to State-controlled address |
Feasibility: ✅ Technically simple (CASPs control the keys)
Scenario 2: Requisition of a French crypto company (Ledger)
| Step | Action |
|---|---|
| 1 | Decree in Council of Ministers |
| 2 | Taking control of the company |
| 3 | Obligation of technical cooperation |
| 4 | Deployment of extractive updates |
Feasibility: ⚠️ Technically possible (cf. Ledger Recover)
Scenario 3: Requisition of an individual's crypto-assets
| Step | Action |
|---|---|
| 1 | Targeted or general decree |
| 2 | Declaration/surrender obligation |
| 3 | Penalties for non-cooperation |
Feasibility: ❌ Technically difficult (self-custody resistant)
5.3 Technical Limits of Requisition
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ HIERARCHY OF RESISTANCE TO REQUISITION │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Minimal resistance Maximum resistance
│ │
▼ ▼
┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ French CEX │ Ledger │ Trezor │ Coldcard │ SeedSigner │
│ (Coinhouse) │ (FR) │ (CZ) │ (CA) │ (DIY) │
│ │ │ │ │ │
│ ✅ Easily │ ⚠️ Via │ ⚠️ EU │ ❌ Beyond │ ❌ No entity │
│ requisition-│ forced │ coop │ direct │ to requisition │
│ able │ update │ possible│ reach │ │
└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
5.4 Expert Analysis
"The LPM gives the government considerable powers, but its application to crypto-assets runs into a technical reality: you cannot requisition what you cannot identify or seize."
Source: Maître David Guyon, Lawyer, LPM analysis, June 2024
6. International Comparisons
Executive Order 6102: when Roosevelt confiscated Americans' gold.
6.1 United States: Executive Order 6102 (1933)
Context: Great Depression, flight from the dollar.
Measure: President Roosevelt prohibited gold ownership by individuals.
"All persons are required to deliver [...] all gold coin, gold bullion and gold certificates in their possession."
Source: Executive Order 6102, April 5, 1933
Result:
- Massive gold confiscation
- Compensation at $20.67/ounce
- Immediate revaluation to $35/ounce (40% loss for citizens)
- Penalty: $10,000 fine and 10 years in prison
Crypto parallel: An "Executive Order 6102 for Bitcoin" is regularly mentioned as a risk.
6.2 United Kingdom: Emergency Powers Act
The United Kingdom has similar emergency powers via the Emergency Powers Act 1920 (amended):
| Power | Description |
|---|---|
| Emergency proclamation | By the Crown, on government advice |
| Requisitions | "Essential" goods and services |
| Duration | 7 days renewable (parliamentary approval) |
Key difference: Tighter parliamentary control than in France.
6.3 Germany: Notstandsverfassung
The German Constitution provides for an emergency regime (Notstandsverfassung) since 1968:
| Regime | Trigger | Powers |
|---|---|---|
| Spannungsfall | International tension | Limited requisitions |
| Verteidigungsfall | Armed aggression | Extended powers |
| Innerer Notstand | Internal threat | Federal intervention |
Key difference: Stricter controls, role of Bundestag and Bundesrat.
6.4 Comparative Table
| Country | Requisition Power | Control | Compensation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🇫🇷 France | Very broad (LPM) | Weak (ex post appeal) | "Fair price" |
| 🇺🇸 USA | Via Emergency Powers | Moderate (Congress) | Compensation provided |
| 🇬🇧 UK | Emergency Powers Act | Strong (Parliament 7d) | Provided |
| 🇩🇪 Germany | Notstandsverfassung | Strong (Bundestag) | Constitutional guarantee |
| 🇨🇭 Switzerland | Exceptional powers | Strong (referendum possible) | Constitutional guarantee |
7. Application Scenarios
Economic crisis, attack, or strategic reserve: three plausible triggers.
7.1 "Major Economic Crisis" Scenario
Context:
- French sovereign debt crisis
- Capital flight to Bitcoin
- Franc devaluation (if euro exit)
Possible measures:
- Ban on crypto-asset purchases
- Requisition of French exchanges
- Wallet declaration obligation
- Confiscatory exit taxation
Probability: Low to medium term, but not zero in case of major crisis.
7.2 "Terrorism Financing" Scenario
Context:
- Major attack on French soil
- Financing identified via Bitcoin
Possible measures:
- Immediate freezing of suspects' assets
- Data requisition from exchanges
- Pressure on hardware wallet manufacturers
- Ban on privacy coins
Probability: High in case of attack, predictable emotional reaction.
7.3 "Bitcoin Strategic Reserve" Scenario
Context:
- Bitcoin adoption by other States (USA, Russia)
- Race for Bitcoin reserves
- France wants to build a reserve
Possible measures:
- Market purchase (legal option)
- Requisition of citizens' holdings (extreme option)
- National mining (technical option)
Probability: Low for requisition, possible for public purchase.
7.4 Probability/Impact Matrix
| Scenario | Probability | Impact | Preparation Needed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Major economic crisis | 🟡 Medium | 🔴 Very high | High |
| Crypto-financed attack | 🟡 Medium | 🟡 Medium | Medium |
| Strategic reserve | 🟢 Low | 🔴 Very high | Low |
| Major armed conflict | 🟢 Low | 🔴 Total | High if concerned |
8. Legal Remedies
Summary proceedings, QPC, and ECHR: challenging a requisition before the courts.
8.1 Appeal for Abuse of Power
Jurisdiction: Administrative court, then Council of State.
Deadline: 2 months from notification or publication.
Grounds invocable:
- Incompetence of the author of the act
- Formal or procedural defect
- Error of law
- Manifest error of assessment
- Misuse of power
Suspensive effect: ❌ No, except summary suspension.
8.2 Summary Freedom Proceedings
Conditions (Article L. 521-2 CJA):
- Serious and manifestly illegal infringement
- Of a fundamental freedom
- Urgency
Judgment deadline: 48 hours
Freedoms invocable:
- Property rights
- Freedom of enterprise
- Respect for privacy
8.3 Summary Suspension
Conditions (Article L. 521-1 CJA):
- Urgency
- Serious doubt about legality
Effect: Suspension of execution of the act.
8.4 Priority Question of Constitutionality (QPC)
Conditions:
- Question raised in the context of a dispute
- Legislative provision applicable to the dispute
- Question not already decided
- Serious question
Constitutional rights invocable:
- Article 17 DDHC (property)
- Article 2 DDHC (liberty)
- Article 13 DDHC (equality before public burdens)
8.5 European Appeal (ECHR)
After exhausting domestic remedies:
| ECHR Article | Protection |
|---|---|
| Article 1 Protocol 1 | Property rights |
| Article 8 | Privacy |
| Article 13 | Right to an effective remedy |
Deadline: 4 months after final domestic decision.
Average duration: 5-7 years before judgment.
9. Protection Strategies
Self-custody and jurisdictional diversification: the three-level protection architecture.
9.1 Jurisdictional Diversification
Principle: Distribute your assets among several jurisdictions to limit the impact of a single requisition.
| Jurisdiction | FR Requisition Risk | Advantage |
|---|---|---|
| France | 🔴 Maximum | - |
| EU (other country) | 🟡 Via cooperation | Legal distance |
| Switzerland | 🟢 Low | Neutrality, bank secrecy |
| Singapore | 🟢 Low | Distance, stability |
| Self-custody | 🟢 Technically impossible | Total sovereignty |
9.2 Self-Custody as Protection
Why self-custody resists requisition:
- No third party to requisition: No company holds your keys
- No location: A wallet can be anywhere
- No physical confiscation: A seed phrase can be memorized
- Plausible deniability: Passphrase = hidden wallet
9.3 Multi-Level Architecture
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ PROTECTION ARCHITECTURE │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Level 1: DISPLAY (requisitionable)
────────────────────────────────────
Small amount on French exchange
Declared, compliant, visible
= Acceptable "sacrifice"
Level 2: INTERMEDIATE (difficult)
────────────────────────────────────
Hardware wallet (Coldcard, outside EU)
Self-custody, secured seed
= Technical protection
Level 3: SOVEREIGN (resistant)
────────────────────────────────────
Multisig with distributed keys
Passphrase (hidden wallet)
Key in third jurisdiction
= Maximum protection
9.4 Limits and Risks
⚠️ Warning: These strategies aim at legitimate asset protection. Fraudulent organization of insolvency is a criminal offense.
What is legal:
- Holding your crypto-assets in self-custody
- Distributing your assets across several jurisdictions
- Using privacy technologies
What is not:
- Transferring assets to escape an already pronounced requisition
- Lying about the existence or value of your assets
- Organizing your insolvency against a tax debt
📚 Related Articles — Legal Analyses
- Bitcoin in Business: SAS, Holding and Treasury Strategy
- SATD Crypto: Protection from Administrative Seizure
- Crypto Tax Audit: Procedure and Defense
- DeFi Regulation: Beyond Control
- Non-European Hardware Wallets: Legal Strategy
10. Sources and References
Legislative and Regulatory Texts
- Law No. 2023-703 of August 1, 2023 relating to military programming for the years 2024 to 2030
- Decree No. 2024-895 of October 1, 2024 relating to requisitions
- Defense Code, Book II, Title I (requisitions)
- Ordinance No. 59-63 of January 6, 1959 (former regime)
Constitutional Decisions
- CC, decision No. 2023-854 DC of July 28, 2023 (LPM)
- CC, decision No. 85-198 DC of December 13, 1985 (state of emergency)
- CC, decision No. 81-132 DC of January 16, 1982 (nationalizations)
Administrative Case Law
- CE, Ass., February 17, 1950, Dame Lamotte
- CE, October 12, 2009, No. 329628 (requisition of strikers)
- CE, ref., March 22, 2020, No. 439674 (Covid requisition)
Historical Sources
- Executive Order 6102, April 5, 1933 (gold confiscation in USA)
- Emergency Powers Act 1920 (United Kingdom)
- Grundgesetz, Articles 35, 87a, 91 (Germany)
Doctrinal Analyses
- Maître David Guyon, "Requisitions under the 2023-2030 Military Programming Law," June 2024
- IRIS France, "The Essential Reform of Defense Code Requisitions," November 2024
- Public Law Review, "The New Requisition Regime," 2024
Parliamentary Documentation
- National Assembly, Report No. 1234 on the LPM 2024-2030 bill
- Senate, Report No. 567 on the LPM 2024-2030 bill
- Explanatory memorandum, LPM bill
Appendix: Chronology of Exceptional Powers in France
| Year | Text | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| 1849 | State of siege law | Military |
| 1955 | State of emergency law | Civil (Algeria) |
| 1959 | Requisitions ordinance | National defense |
| 2015 | State of emergency post-attacks | Extended civil |
| 2020 | Health emergency state | Health |
| 2023 | LPM 2024-2030 | Expanded requisitions |
| 2024 | LPM implementing decree | Operationalization |
Document written in December 2025
This document is provided for informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice. Consult a lawyer for your personal situation.